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Introduction 
 Over the past twenty years, the legal community and the American public have witnessed 
the exposure of several cases of wrongful convictions in the past through the use of DNA 
evidence and other modern scientific techniques exonerating the accused.2  This has lead to the 
founding of several organizations designed to combat wrongful convictions and to lobby for the 
correction of the factors contributing to such convictions, as well as investigations and 
recommendations concerning criminal procedural safeguards and other measures by federal and 
                                                 
1 J.D. 2006, Yale Law School; B.A., Philosophy, International Studies, and Spanish, 2003, University of Alabama.  
The author would like to thank Professor Mirjan Damaska, Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University, for his 
critical commentary, and Deputy District Attorney Alan Baty of the Jefferson County, Alabama District Attorney’s 
Office for his help in developing the concept of this Article. 
2 See, e.g., BARRY C. SCHECK, ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION, AND OTHER DISPATCHES 
FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000).  See also C. Ronald Huff, Wrongful Conviction: Causes and Public Policy 
Issues, 18 CRIM. JUST. 14 (2003); Richard A. Rosen, Innocence and Death, 82 N.C. L. REV. 61 (2003); David L. 
Feige, “I’ll Never Forget that Face”: The Science and the Law of the Double-Blind Sequential Lineup, 26 
Champion 28 (2002); Margery Malkin Koosed, The Proposed Innocence Protection Act Won’t—Unless It Also 
Curbs Mistaken Eyewitness Identifications, 63 Ohio St. L.J. 263 (2002); Paul G. Cassell, Criminal Law: Protecting 
the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost Confessions—And From Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
497 (1998); Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the 
Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317 (1997); Steven Wisotsky, Miscarriages of Justice: Their Causes and Cures, 9 
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 547 (1997).  But see Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and the “Innocent”: An Examination of 
Alleged Cases of Wrongful Conviction from False Confessions, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 523 (1999). 
Alabama has had its own share of recently exposed wrongful convictions, most notably the cases of Dale 
and Ronnie Mahan, who were convicted in Alabama for the 1983 abduction and rape of a young woman. The victim 
was taken from a shopping mall, taken to the woods, forced to use drugs, and raped several times.  The victim later 
identified the brothers from a photo lineup, having gotten a look at the perpetrators when they had lifted their masks. 
Based largely on her identification, Ronnie and Dale Mahan were convicted in 1984. Ronnie was sentenced to life 
without parole and Dale to thirty-five years in prison. At trial, the prosecution contended that Dale Mahan raped the 
victim while Ronnie watched.  The Mahans gained access to the biological evidence in 1998. Swabs from the rape 
kit were tested and excluded both brothers, the victim's husband, and another man named as a possible contributor. 
Examination of pubic hairs collected also excluded the Mahan brothers.  The actual perpetrator has yet to be found.  
The Cardozo Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.com/ case/search_profiles.php [Dale Mahan] (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2005). In all, Alabama has exonerated over twenty-six wrongly convicted persons. Center on 
Wrongful Convictions: The Exonerated,   http://www. law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/wrongful/exonerations/ 
AlabamaList.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).   
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state authorities.3  One factor consistently identified as problematic is erroneous eyewitness 
testimony or identification, which is found to be a factor in over two-thirds of the documented 
cases of wrongful conviction in the United States.4  Commentators, courts, and others have 
offered several approaches to the problem of faulty eyewitness identifications, ranging from the 
exclusion of questionable eyewitness testimony altogether to the prohibition of any conviction 
based solely on uncorroborated eyewitness testimony.5 
 Another suggested solution and recent trend of the criminal defense bar in Alabama and 
elsewhere, is to call expert testimony to rebut the testimony of eyewitnesses proffered by the 
state.6  These experts are usually psychiatrists or psychologists who testify to the fallibility of 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., The Innocence Project at Cardozo University, homepage at http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2005), documenting 163 exonerations of innocent defendants at first convicted and later exonerated after 
the discovery of new evidence, usually DNA evidence; NAT’L INST. OF JUST. REP., Convicted by Juries, Exonerated 
by Science: Case Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence After Trial (June 1996) (Eds. Edward 
Connors, et al.). 
4 Edward Imwinkeried, Flawed Expert Testimony: Striking the Right Balance in Admissibility Standards, 18 CRIM. 
JUST. 28, 29 (Spring 2003). 
5 See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Elizabeth Loftus’s Eyewitness Testimony, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 441, 454–55 (1981) 
(book review). 
6 Telephone Interview with Alan Baty, Deputy District Attorney for Jefferson County, Alabama (Oct. 28, 2005).   
Although most commentators argue that this should be a widespread solution, this paper argues against the 
admission of expert eyewitness evidence in the case of Alabama for the reasons explored in Parts III and IV infra.  
For arguments concerning the admission of expert eyewitness evidence, see Scott Ehlers, Eyewitness Identification: 
State Law Reform, 29 CHAMPION 34 (2005); Lisa Steele, Identification Law Reform, 29 CHAMPION 24 (2005); Gary 
L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Science and Reform, 29 CHAMPION 12 (2005); Brooke Whisonant 
Patterson, The “Tyranny of the Eyewitness”, 29 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 195 (2004);  Barry C. Scheck, Mistaken 
Eyewitness Identification: Three Roads to Reform, 28 CHAMPION 4 (2004); Scott Woller, Rethinking the Role of 
Expert Testimony Regarding the Reliability of Eyewitness Identifications in New York, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 323 
(2004); Robert P. Burns, A Response to Four Readings of a Theory of the Trial, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 553, 563 
(2003);  James M. Doyle et al., The Eyes Have It—Or Do They? New Guides for Better Eyewitness Evidence 
Procedure, 16 CRIM. JUST. 12 (2001); William David Gross, Note, The Unfortunate Faith: A Solution to the 
Unwarranted Reliance Upon Eyewitness Testimony, 5 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 307 (1999); Peter J. Cohen, How 
Shall They Be Known?  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals and Eyewitness Identification, 16 PACE L. REV. 
237 (1996); Robert J. Hallisey, Experts on Eyewitness Testimony in Court—A Short Historical Perspective, 39 HOW. 
L.J. 237 (1995); Michael R. Leippe, The Case for Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Memory, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 909 (1995); Cindy J. O’Hagan, When Seeing Is Not Believing: The Case for Eyewitness Expert 
Testimony, 81 GEO. L.J. 741 (1993); Wayne T. Westling, The Case for Expert Witness Assistance to the Jury in 
Eyewitness Identification Cases, 71 OR. L. REV. 93 (1992); Brenda J. Hamilton, Expert Testimony on the Reliability 
of Eyewitness Identifications: A Critical Analysis of Its Admissibility, 54 MO. L. REV. 734 (1989); Richard J. Nelson, 
Identifications, 76 GEO. L.J. 650 (1988); Maureen A. Gorman, Note, Evaluating Eyewitness Testimony in Criminal 
Trials: Can Jurors Use Help from Experts?, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 137 (1987); Frederick Emerson Chemay, 
Unreliable Eyewitness Evidence: The Expert Psychologist and the Defense in Criminal Cases, 45 LA. L. REV. 721 
(1985). 
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eyewitness testimony generally, and may testify to certain phenomenon particular to the case 
(e.g., weapon focus, transference, etc.).7  In a few cases, these expert witnesses will actually 
interview the eyewitnesses involved, but this is often the exception rather than the rule.   
 Both state and federal courts have largely split on whether this expert evidence is 
admissible under the “substantially more prejudicial than probative” evidentiary standard found 
in Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,8 the “helpful to the trier of fact” standard 
embodied in Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,9 or under the “reliability of scientific 
methods and principles” standard of the same Rule 702.10  Although such expert testimony may 
be helpful in cases where the only evidence against the accused is eyewitness testimony or there 
is some salient psychological aspect of such testimony that may mislead the jury (and there is a 
consensus in the scientific community on this finding), such expert testimony seems superfluous 
in the majority of cases.  This is especially the case in Alabama, where there is a split in circuit 
criminal courts as to whether this testimony should be admissible.11   
 Part I of this paper will summarize the possible sources of error found in eyewitness 
testimony according to psychological and cognitive science research.  In Part II, I explore the 
admissibility of this expert testimony under the existing rules of evidence according to both 
federal law and Alabama state law, as well as court commentary on its admissibility.  Part III 
argues that the liberal admission of such testimony is not warranted in the case of Alabama.  
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Simmons, 662 A.2d 621, 630–31 (Pa. 1995) (holding that expert testimony on the 
general reliability of eyewitness identification and factors that may affect such an identification generally was 
improper as it would “intrude upon the jury’s basic function of deciding credibility”); Ex Parte Williams, 594 So.2d 
1225 (Ala. 1992) (ruling that expert testimony from a psychologist intending to testify on eyewitness identification 
was inadmissible because the psychologist had not interviewed the particular eyewitness in the case) 
8 The correlating rule in Alabama is AL. R. EVID. 403, discussed infra. 
9 The correlating rule in Alabama is AL. R. EVID. 702, discussed infra.  
10 Id. 
11 Compare State v. Edwards, CC 01-183, CC 01-184, Jefferson Co., Ala. Cir. Ct. (Nov. 1, 2001) (allowing the 
admission of expert testimony on eyewitness identification) and State v. Bonner, CC 00-1271, CC 00-1272, 
Jefferson Co., Ala. Cir. Ct. (Mar. 1, 2000) (allowing the admission of expert testimony on eyewitness identification) 
with State v. Frank, CC 04-4329, Mobile Co., Ala. Cir. Ct. (June 6, 2005) (prohibiting the admission of expert 
testimony on eyewitness identification).   
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Taking into consideration the policies which constitute the state’s provision of legal services to 
indigent defendants as discussed in Part IV, five arguments counsel against the admission of 
expert testimony, including: the trial court’s discretion in admitting such evidence; the 
evidence’s limited utility; the evidence can be more prejudicial than probative in a jury trial 
setting; there is considerable disagreement within the scientific community about the accuracy 
and value of such evidence; and efficacious safeguards already exist or more effective safeguards 
should take priority over the admission of such evidence.  The paper concludes in Part V that 
Alabama’s criminal justice system and Alabama defendants would be better served by 
implementing a presumption against the admissibility of expert testimony on the reliability of 
eyewitness evidence.  This presumption coupled with a bright line test for when the evidence 
should be admitted in certain cases would allow the state to concentrate on improving its 
provision of legal entitlements to all indigent defendants. 
I. Sources of Error in Eyewitness Testimony 
 A.  General Theories of Why Eyewitness Testimony May Be Inaccurate 
 There are various contributing factors to mistaken eyewitness identification, including 
most fundamentally the functioning of human perception, memory, and recollection systems in 
the brain and nervous systems.  This section will not analyze the scientific data in detail, as this 
is not the focus of the paper.  However, a brief exposition of the most common sources of error 
in eyewitness testimony is warranted. 
 Generally, the human memory process occurs in three stages: acquisition stage (acquiring 
and encoding the information), retention stage (the information is retained in the memory), and 
the recognition or recall stage (the information is retrieved from the memory from some specific 
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purpose).12  Each stage may be vulnerable to a variety of factors that may make the memory of a 
particular event less accurate. 
 Several psychological studies have focused on characteristics endemic to the human 
memory process, attempting to isolate and analyze those factors within the human memory 
process itself that will affect the accuracy of eyewitness recall.  The “theory of forgetting” states 
that humans forget information for several reasons, including: memory capacity is not infinite 
and thus some information is lost, someone may deliberately choose to forget some information, 
or post-event interference (from trauma, external sources, etc.) can affect one’s ability to retain 
information or may alter the memory of that information.13  Some studies have found that stress 
and accurate memory have a U-type relation (graphically), such that at low and high stress 
levels, the lack or overload of stress may impair a person’s ability to accurately encode and 
retain information, but a certain amount of stress is usually necessary for accurate encoding and 
retention.14  The “self-motivation factor” or “self-protective notion” comes into play where a 
witness feels that he is personally threatened, and therefore concentrates less on remembering 
different aspects of the event, including the assailant’s features.15 Certain feelings, such as 
wanting to feel more secure or wanting to aid the police in suspect identification, may cause a 
                                                 
12 Human Memory, available at http://human-factors.arc.nasa.gov/cognition/tutorials/ModelOf/Knowmore1.html 
(last accessed Oct. 31, 2005).   
13 F. Heuer & D. Reisberg, Emotion, Arousal, and Memory for Detail, in THE HANDBOOK OF EMOTION AND 
MEMORY: RESEARCH AND THEORY (S. A. Christianson, ed., 1992).  
14 See generally S.M. Kassin et al., The “General Acceptance” of Psychological Research on Eyewitness Testimony: 
A Survey of Experts, 44 AM. PSYCHOL. 1089 (1989).  Some studies have shown that stress and accurate memory 
have a U-type relation graphically—at low and high stress levels, the lack or overload of stress may impair a 
person’s ability to accurately encode and retain information (the first two stages of the human memory process).  
Most of these studies test the relation of stress and memory accuracy first developed in 1908 and referred to as the 
Yerkes-Dodson Law.  See ELIZABETH LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 8–19 (1979). 
15 S. A. Christianson, Emotional Stress and Eyewitness Memory: A Critical Review, 112 PSYCHOL. BULLET. 284 
(1992).   
6 
witness to make a quicker and, consequently, less accurate identification.16  Additionally, expert 
testimony will often point to the arguably counter-intuitive notion that the confidence exhibited 
by an eyewitness does not necessarily correlate to the accuracy of the identification.17  Some 
authors suggest that post-event information, discussed in the paragraph below, will make a 
witness more confident in their description or identification of an accused over time, while others 
 Other studies have focused on the collection of eyewitness evidence and what effects 
these procedures may have on the reliability of eyewitness accounts.  For example, some studies 
suggest that post-event information provided to a witness may make them more confident in their 
identification of an assailant over time or alter their perception of the event such that this post-
event information is incorporated into the eyewitness’s actual memory.18  Therefore, the way in 
which the police collect eyewitness testimony, the way that a photographic or live line-up is set 
up, or even the way that a question is asked may influence someone’s memory of a particular 
event.19  Eyewitness susceptibility to misinformation or suggestion from police or other officials 
after the event will affect the accuracy of an eyewitness account, and these inaccuracies can be 
induced at any of the three stages of the human memory process.20  Structural biases in a 
                                                 
16 Donald P. Judges, Two Cheers for the Department of Justice’s Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law 
Enforcement, 53 ARK. L. REV. 231, 248–49 (2000); D. J. Hilton, The Social Context of Reasoning: Conversational 
Inference and Rational Judgment, 118 PSYCHOL. BULL. 248 (1995). 
17 T. J. Perfect et al., Accuracy of Confidence Ratings Associated with General Knowledge and Eyewitness Memory, 
78 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 144 (1993); M. L. Fleet et al., The Confidence-Accuracy Relationship: The Effects of 
Confidence Assessment and Choosing, 17 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 171 (1987).     
18 See LOFTUS, supra note 14, at 94–97.   
19 Michael R. Headley, Note, Long on Substance, Short on Process: An Appeal for Process Long Overdue in 
Eyewitness Lineup Procedures, 53 HASTINGS L. J. 685–88 (2002).  
20 See 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 259 (1993) (noting that 
inaccuracies can be introduced at any stage of the human memory process); Winn S. Collins, Improving Eyewitness 
Evidence Collection Procedures in Wisconsin, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 529 (2003); D. Michael Risinger et al., The 
Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and 
Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2002); Jake Sussman, Suspect Choices: Lineup Procedures and the Abdication of 
Judicial and Prosecutorial Responsibility for Improving the Criminal Justice System, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. 
CHANGE 507, 514–15 (2002). 
 The Supreme Court recognized the potential for the corruption of the pre-trial lineup in United States v. 
Wade and held that a defendant may be deprived of his constitutional right to cross-examination insofar as he is 
helpless to subject the fruits of a suspect trial pretrial identification to effective scrutiny at trial.  388 U.S. 218, 235 
7 
photograph lineup or live lineup presented to a witness (such as a different background color for 
one of the mugshots or variance in height of the live individuals) may cause an inaccurate 
identification.21  Additionally, if a live lineup follows the photograph identification, the 
identification in the live lineup may not be accurate or based on the original memory in that the 
witness was just exposed to the photographic lineup.22 
 Perhaps more intuitively, external factors are known to affect the accuracy of eyewitness 
identifications.  Changes in lighting may affect the eye’s ability to accurately view something as 
the eye needs a period of adjustment time to new lighting, and may, therefore, affect the accurate 
encoding of information in the memory.23  Less exposure time to an event may cause a witness’s 
memory to be less accurate.24  Related to the duration of a witness’s exposure to the event is that 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1967).  The court suggested that the presence of defense counsel may protect the integrity of any pretrial lineup and 
aid the defense at trial to effectively counter any identification evidence. 
 
[When] it appears that there is grave potential for prejudice, intentional or not, in a pretrial lineup, 
which may not be capable of reconstruction at trial, and when presence of counsel itself can often 
avert prejudice and assure a meaningful confrontation at trial, there can be little doubt that post-
indictment lineup is a critical stage of the prosecution at which an accused is as much entitled to 
the aid of counsel as the trial itself. 
 
Id. at 236. 
21 EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, NAT’L INST. OF JUST.  (Oct. 1999) [hereinafter “Law 
Enforcement Guide”] , available at National Institute of Justice website, http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1 
/nij/178240.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 1999).  For a discussion of this guide, see Donald P. Judges, Two Cheers for 
the Department of Justice’s Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement, 53 ARK. L. REV. 231 (2000).  See 
also Michael R. Headley, Long on Substance, Short on Process: An Appeal for Process Long Overdue in Eyewitness 
Lineup Procedures, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 681 (2002). 
22 See Law Enforcement Guide, supra note 21.  See generally, Jessica Lee, Note, No Exigency, Not Consent: 
Protecting Innocent Suspects from the Consequences of Non-Exigent Show-Ups, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 755 
(2005); Jake Sussman, Suspect Choices: Lineup Procedures and the Abdication of Judicial and Prosecutorial 
Responsibility for Improving the Criminal Justice System, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 507 (2002); Gary L. 
Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological Research and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 765 (1995). 
23 B.R. Clifford & J. Scott, Individual and Situational Factors in Eyewitness Testimony, 63 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 352 
(1978). 
24 Robert Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, 231 Sci. Am. 23, 25 (1974).  See also David Nachshon, Editor’s Page, 
24 MED. & L. I (2005).  However, there are studies on “flashbulb memory” that suggest that certain memories may 
imprint on the brain like a picture after only one exposure.  See, e.g., R. Brown & J. Kulik, Flashbulb Memories, 5 
COGNITION 73 (1977). Additionally, a 1986 study by Shapiro and Penrod found that variance in exposure time will 
affect the rate of “hits” (correctly identifying suspect from line-up) versus “misses” (failing to identify the suspect 
from line-up), but has little or no affect on the rates of “false alarms” (falsely identifying a person from the line-up 
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people tend to overestimate their exposure time to an event, especially if under stress, which is 
referred to as “time expansion” by the literature.25  Typically, the more of an assailant that a 
witness is able to view, the more accurate the identification will be.26  When there is more than 
one perpetrator, or “multiple targets,” the witness generally has less time to focus on a particular 
target and may confuse the features of individual targets; thus, the identification of any particular 
target tends to be less accurate.27  Intoxication from drugs and/or alcohol impairs an individual’s 
ability to accurately encode information (acquire the information and commit it to memory) at 
the time of the event.28  People may not recognize how impaired they are by drugs and/or 
alcohol, thereby causing them to give erroneous descriptions or make faulty identifications later.  
Finally, a witness’s lack of prior familiarity with an assailant may increase the inaccuracy of an 
identification,29 and the confidence of an eyewitness’s identification will not necessarily be 
indicative of the accuracy of the identification.30 
 Other studies suggest that the presence of a weapon or the ethnicity of the witness and/or 
suspect may affect eyewitness accuracy.  A phenomenon known as “weapon focus”, on which 
there are “robust” findings in studies, suggests some eyewitness or victim testimony may be 
unreliable due to the person focusing more on the weapon as opposed to the assailant or other 
                                                                                                                                                             
whom the witness had not seen before; misidentification).  P.N. Shapiro & S. Penrod, Meta-analysis of Facial 
Identification Studies, 100, PSYCHOL. BULL. 139 (1986). 
25 Ebbe B. Ebbesen & Vladimir J. Konecni, Eyewitness Memory Research: Probative v. Prejudicial Value, 5 
EXPERT EVIDENCE: THE INT’L DIG. OF HUM. BEHAV., SCI., & THE L. 2, 17 (1997). 
26 ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 202 (1997). 
27 M.M. Chun & M.C. Potter, A Two-Stage Model for Multiple Target Detection in Rapid Serial Visual 
Presentation, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE, 109. 
28 E. A. Maylor & P. M. A. Rabbitt, Effect of Alcohol on Rate of Forgetting, 91 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 230 
(1987). 
29 C. BARTOL, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE AMERICAN LAW 181 (1983).  
30 See Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy: Assessing Their Forensic Relation, 
1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 817 (1995); Steven I. Friedland, On Common Sense and the Evaluation of Witness 
Credibility, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 165 (1990). 
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events surrounding the incident.31  Cross-racial identifications may be more likely to be 
inaccurate than same-race identifications, as the witness’s identification of the assailant may be 
based on my stereotypical features of the other race.32  Psychologists and cognitive scientists 
testifying will typically claim that the more of the factors discussed above that are present in the 
circumstances surrounding the encoding of a memory and the subsequent identification, the more 
likely an inaccurate identification will result. 
B. Problems with the Science of Detecting Errors in Eyewitness Testimony 
The paramount arguments against the admission of expert testimony on eyewitness 
accuracy are found within the psychology literature itself.  There are four main themes in 
scientific peer criticism: the relevance of the studies to the actual eyewitnesses involved; the 
interaction problem; consistency amongst the studies; and criticisms of specific theories.  Again, 
the aim of this section is not to exhaust all criticisms of the cognitive theories emerging from the 
studies of eyewitness situations, but only to provide a brief counter-argument to the justifications 
set forth in Part I.A.  
First of all, many studies may not be able to plausibly claim relevance to real life 
eyewitness situations.  They often involve staged films or events, the test subjects are almost 
                                                 
31 P.A. Tollerstrup et al., Actual Victims and Witnesses to Robbery and Fraud: An Archival Analysis, in ADULT 
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CURRENT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS (D.F. Ross et al. eds., 1994); Elizabeth Loftus et 
al., Some Facts About “Weapon Focus,” 11 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 55 (1987); D. Kramer et al., Weapon Focus, 
Arousal, and Eyewitness Memory, 14 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 167 (1990); A. Maass & G. Köhnken, Eyewitness 
Identification: Simulating the “Weapon Effect,” 13 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 397 (1989); V. Tooley et al., Facial 
Recognition: Weapon Effect and Attentional Focus, 17 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 845 (1987). 
32 See S. M. Kassin et al., The “General Acceptance” of Psychological Research on Eyewitness Testimony: A Survey 
of the Experts, 44 AM. PSYCHOL. 1089 (1989).  See generally, Christian A. Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty 
Years of Investigating the Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & 
L. 3 (2001); James M. Doyle, Discounting the Error Costs: Cross-Racial False Alarms in the Culture of 
Contemporary Criminal Justice, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 253 (2001); Siegfried L. Sporer, The Cross-Race 
Effect: Beyond Recognition of Faces in the Laboratory, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 170 (2001); Gary L. Wells & 
Elizabeth A. Olson, The Other-Race Effect in Eyewitness Identification: What Do We Do About It?, 7 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 230 (2001); Radha Natarajan, Note, Racialized Memory and Reliability: Due Process Applied to 
Cross-Racial Eyewitness Identification, 78 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1821 (2003).   
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universally college students, and often the test subjects may be aware that they will later be 
evaluated for the accuracy of their memory.33   
Most studies from which experts seem to draw their conclusions in the eyewitness 
area appear to lack face validity [relevance on their surface to the legal questions 
for which the authors typically claim relevance]. . . . Virtually all of the studies 
conducted on eyewitness memory involve witnesses, whereas it is, in fact, the 
victims who supply the evidence in the majority of crimes (with the exception of 
murder) in which eyewitness identification is part of the evidence against the 
defendant.”34   
 
Thus, few studies relied upon by would-be expert witnesses on eyewitness testimony effectively 
replicate the situations in which actual eyewitnesses would be placed in real crimes.  
Furthermore, few studies use the primary witnesses often presented by the prosecution—the 
victims themselves.  Although it may be difficult to reproduce actual crime scenarios in field 
experiments, other studies, have used “victims” in studies, finding them to be consistently more 
reliable and accurate in their identifications than witnesses otherwise unaffected by the crime.35  
The relationship that some studies find linking one factor, for example, weapon focus, to 
eyewitness memory seems to depend on the levels of other factors present in the other factors.36  
Therefore, the findings of many studies may have limited validity in that they are unable to speak 
to the effects of any one factor on eyewitness memory without putting the results in the context 
                                                 
33 See, e.g., J.C. Brigham, Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications in a Field Setting, 42 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 673 (1982); C. Krafka & S. Penrod, Reinstatement of Context in a Field Experiment on Eyewitness 
Identification, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 58 (1985); S.J. Platz & H. M. Hosch, Cross Racial/Ethnic 
Eyewitness Identification: A Field Study, 18 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 972 (1988). 
34 Ebbesen & Konecni, supra note 25, at 3.  See also H.E. Egeth, What Do We Not Know About Eyewitness 
Identification?, 48 AM. PSYCHOL. 577 (1993); G.L. Wells, What Do We Know About Eyewitness Identification?, 48 
AM. PSYCHOL. 553 (1993); J.C. Yuille, Expert Evidence by Psychologists: Sometimes Problematic and Often 
Premature, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 181 (1989). 
35 A study by Hosch and Cooper in 1982 revealed a high rate of accuracy in identifications when someone’s 
personal property is taken, a lower rate when it was not their personal property, but that of another, and still a lower 
rate of accuracy when nothing was taken.  H.M. Hosch & S.D. Cooper, Victimization as a Determinant of 
Eyewitness Accuracy, 67 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 648 (1982).  
36 Ebbesen & Konecni, supra note 25, at 17. 
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of all other variables that may affect eyewitness memory.  Most studies do not attempt to do so.37  
At least one team of scientists has recognized this failing in other studies, and argues that this is 
yet one more reason to exclude this expert testimony from courtroom proceedings. 
[T]estimony about the effect of a given factor on memory should be admitted only 
if supported across a wide variety of different methods, procedures, subject types, 
measures, motivational conditions, etc. However, such a requirement puts a 
considerable burden on judicial expertise during pre-trial motions concerning the 
admissibility of eyewitness expert conclusions.  Similarly, to the extent that 
interactions among standard eyewitness memory “factors” exist, should not the 
admissibility of expert testimony about these factors be conditioned on full 
disclosure of those interactions to the jury?38  
 
The scarcity of studies that are successful in isolating variables (to the extent that this is possible 
at all), along with the shortage of studies on each variable suggest that the scientific research in 
this area may be too underdeveloped to be useful in a courtroom setting. 
Also lacking is the consistency among studies, even those testing the same variable.  One 
indication of the lack of consistency among studies is best explored in the next paragraph dealing 
with specific factors.  The other indication stems from how researchers measure the accuracy of 
eyewitness memory across various studies and whether this measurement reflects what will be 
important to the legal system.39  For example, most eyewitness memory simulations measure 
accuracy based upon how many facts subjects may recall after the event or how many of the 
“important” facts witnesses may recall, the importance of a fact being determined by the 
researcher.40  However, “[g]uilt [as determined by the judge or jury] will often depend not on 
how much a witness recalls, but on the accuracy of the witness’s memory of one or two specific 
highly probative facts, e.g, a license plate number, which one of several different people fired a 
                                                 
37 See, e.g., J.W. Shepherd, Identification After Long Delays, in EVALUATING EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE (S. Lloyd-
Bostock & B. Clifford, eds.) (1983); M.R. Leippe, et al., Crime Seriousness as a Determinant of Accuracy in 
Eyewitness Identification, 63 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 345 (1978); A. Maass & G. Köhnken, Eyewitness Identification: 
Simulating the “Weapon Effect”, 13 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 397 (1989).   
38 Ebbesen & Konecni, supra note 25, at 17–18. 
39 Ebbesen & Konecni, supra note 25, at 4. 
40 Ebbesen & Konecni, supra note 25, at 4. 
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gun, and so on.”41  Furthermore, many meta-analytic studies find a high rate of inconsistency 
among studies purporting to analyze the same factor contributing to erroneous eyewitness 
testimony.42  There are several different ways to measure consistency among studies, some more 
stringent and some less.43  Researchers differ over what should constitute consistency in various 
studies.44  However, “if [the results of test comparisons] is not consistent at the weakest of levels, 
then courts should understand that nothing experts can tell jurors will improve their ability to 
make more accurate guilt decisions.”45 
Finally, several studies have explicitly refuted the so-called “accepted” tenets to which 
psychological experts will purport to testify.  This paragraph will not highlight studies that rebut 
each factor discussed in Part I.A, but merely provide some examples.  First, the theory of weapon 
focus, put forth by several cognitive psychologists, has been questioned by several studies.  For 
example, one meta-analytic study reviewing nineteen different studies on weapon focus 
concluded that the presence of a weapon had much less of an effect on identification accuracy 
than the lineup procedures used in the identification process after the event.46  Second, the 
relationship between stress and eyewitness memory hypothesizing that higher levels of stress 
negatively affects the accuracy of identifications has been repeatedly questioned.  A study by 
Yuille and Cutshall in 1986 that used live witnesses and victims to a robbery murder revealed 
that witnesses under more stress were more accurate in recalling facts and making 
                                                 
41 Ebbesen & Konecni, supra note 25, at 4. 
42 Ebbesen & Konecni, supra note 25, at 7.  See also R. Elliot, Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Identification: A 
Critique, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 423 (1993) (concluding that consistency across studies analyzing the accuracy of 
eyewitness memory recall  is questionable after considering several studies claiming to test the same factor affecting 
the accuracy of eyewitness memory and finding that often the studies yielded results differing in statistically 
significant ways).   
43 Ebbesen & Konecni, supra note 25, at 9 
44 Ebbesen & Konecni, supra note 25, at 8–9; R. Rosenthal, Cumulating Psychology: An Appreciation of Donald T. 
Campbell, 2 PSYCHOL. SCI. 213 (1991). 
45 Ebbesen & Konecni, supra note 25, at 10. 
46 N. M. Steblay, Meta-Analytic Study of Weapon Focus, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 413, 420 (1992). 
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identifications.47  Other studies, not normally cited by defense experts, argue that considerable 
evidence supports the claim that emotion generally improves memory, both for peripheral and 
central details.48  Expert testimony relating to the possibility that post-event information 
provided to a witness may make them more confident in their identification of an assailant over 
time is similarly suspect.  A study by Dr. Zaragoza in 1994 showed that post-event information 
does not consistently result in “source misattributions” nor does it result in subjects claiming to 
remember things that they do not.49  Finally, an assertion often made by cognitive psychologists 
and laymen alike, that less exposure time causes eyewitness identifications to be less accurate, 
has been called into question.  A study by Shapiro and Penrod found that variance in exposure 
time will affect the rate of “hits” (correctly identifying suspect from line-up) versus “misses” 
(failing to identify the suspect from line-up), but has little or no affect on the rates of “false 
alarms” (falsely identifying a person from the line-up whom the witness had not seen before; 
misidentification).50  Thus, there may be several questionable assumptions and sources upon 
which expert witnesses testifying as to the accuracy of eyewitness identifications rely, which is 
                                                 
47 J.C. Yuille & J.L. Cutshall, A Case Study of Eyewitness Memory of a Crime, 71 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 291 (1986). 
48 See F. Heuer & D. Reisberg, Emotion, Arousal, and Memory for Detail, in THE HANDBOOK OF EMOTION AND 
MEMORY: RESEARCH AND THEORY (S.A. Christianson, ed.) (1992); J.L. McGaugh, et al., Neuromodulatory Systems 
and Memory Storage: Role of the Amygdala, 58 BEHAV. BRAIN RES. 81 (1993).  A study by Deffenbacher resulted 
in a meta-analysis of other stress and memory studies.  Dr. Deffenbacher looked at 21 studies and found that one-
half of the studies had concluded that people in highly stressful situations tended to be more accurate in their 
identifications and one-half concluded the opposite.  K.A. Deffenbacher, The Influence of Arousal on Reliability of 
Testimony, in EVALUATING EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: RECENT PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH AND NEW PERSPECTIVES 
(S.M.A. Lloyd-Bostock & R.B. Clifford, eds.) (1983).  In 1987, Drs. Tooley, Brigham, Maass and Bothwell 
conducted a study in which they subjected people to blasts of noise and electric shocks as they viewed numerous 
slides.  Those subjects placed under greater stress showed more accuracy in identifications made later.  V. Tooley, 
Facial Recognition: Weapon Effect and Attentional Focus, 17 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 845 (1987).  Finally, a 
study supported by the National Institute of Justice in 1987 by Drs. Cutler, Penrod and Martens varied the degree of 
violence into which subjects were placed in order to test the effects of varying stress levels on eyewitness 
identification accuracy.  Subjects were not forewarned of the stresses, but reported increased stress levels and there 
was no concomitant decrease in the accuracy of their identifications.  B.L. Cutler et al., Improving the Reliability of 
Eyewitness Identification: Putting Context into Context, 72 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 629 (1987). 
49 M.S. Zaragoza & S.M. Lane, Source Misattributions and the Suggestibility of Eyewitness Memory, 20 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 934 (1994). 
50 P.N. Shapiro & S. Penrod, Meta-analysis of Facial Identification Studies, 100 PSYCHOL. BULL. 139 (1986). 
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another reason to hesitate before allowing the free admission of such testimony into criminal 
trials.  
 
II. The Admission of Expert Testimony on the Reliability of Eyewitness Evidence 
A.  Admission under the Rules of Evidence 
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, there are two main venues through which to admit 
expert testimony on eyewitness evidence.  Article VII deals with expert testimony, and 
especially pertinent is the standard under which such evidence is admitted under Rule 702.  Also 
informing the discussion is the ever-present balancing test of Rule 403, excluding evidence that 
may be more prejudicial than probative.  The Alabama Rules of Evidence closely parallel the 
Federal Rules, although the commentary to these rules may alter the analysis.  
The proponent of expert eyewitness testimony has the burden of establishing that the 
admissibility requirements are met by a preponderance of the evidence.51  Such an offer of proof 
is typically made in a pre-trial hearing on a motion in limine pursuant to Rule 104(a),52 during 
which all types of evidence may be offered in order for the court to determine whether such 
evidence is admissible as well as whether it will be helpful to the jury.53 
1. Federal Rules of Evidence 
Pursuant to Rule 702,  
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact 
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon 
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
                                                 
51 Bourjialy v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176 (1987).   
52 FED. R. EVID. 104(a).  This is often referred to as a “Daubert hearing,” so named for the leading U.S. Supreme 
Court case on the admissibility of expert evidence.  See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
53 See Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert Test, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1345, 1374–75 
1994). 
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methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to 
the facts of the case.54 
 
The analysis contemplating the admission of expert testimony on eyewitness evidence under 
these rules merits parsing the Rule itself.  First, is such evidence scientific knowledge?  
Proponents of admission will cite to the scientific studies outlined in Part I.A., supra,55 while 
opponents of admissibility will undoubtedly point to the criticisms recited in Part I.B, supra.  
Second, is the particular witness in question qualified as an expert in this field?  This, 
undoubtedly, would turn upon the particular witness’s qualifications generally, his or her 
qualifications in light of the specific issues in the case, and his or her knowledge of the facts and 
familiarity with the witnesses in the case at bar.56   Next, is the witness purporting to base his 
testimony on reliable principles and methods as well as sufficient data?  This is a hotly contested 
issue in the case law,57 although the overwhelming consensus seems to be that the fields of 
cognitive and behavioral psychology have not yet reached the requisite level of consensus on 
many issues on which expert eyewitness testimony would comment at trial.  Finally, is the 
witness reliably applying the aforementioned methods to the case at trial?  Again, this may be a 
fact-intensive issue, examining not only the foundations of the expert’s proposed testimony, but 
also the expert’s knowledge of the case at hand, and how the expert intends to relate these 
“scientific” findings to the eyewitness testimony in question. 
                                                 
54 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
55 See, e.g., Hon. Robert P. Murrian, The Admissibility of Expert Eyewitness Testimony Under the Federal Rules, 29 
CUMB. L. REV. 379, 381–86 (1999). 
56 Some courts find this last criterion to be the deciding factor on the admissibility of such testimony.  See, e.g., 
People v. Acala, 842 P.2d 1192, 1219–20 (1992) (noting that “[a]lthough [the expert] was prepared to testify that 
police investigators had employed improper interrogation techniques while interviewing [the witness], he had not 
attended those sessions, a circumstance that lessened the probative value of the opinion he would render). 
57 See Part II.B.1 and 2, infra.  
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 Rule 403 authorizes the exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence that, considering all 
factors, would unduly burden a court or mislead the trier of fact.58  Therefore, even if found to be 
scientifically valid and otherwise relevant to the issues in the case, the court may opt to exclude 
such evidence for more administrative or practical reasons under this “balancing test.”  Rule 403 
states the permissibility of exclusion, “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence.”59  Again, perhaps it is best to parse through the various 
issues in the rule.  Basically, the rule gives the trial judge the discretion to exclude relevant 
evidence if one of three qualifiers is present: the evidence would be more prejudicial than 
probative to the trier of fact; the evidence would confuse or mislead the trier of fact; or the 
admission of such evidence would result in the court’s time being misspent.  At least two 
members of the scientific community,60 bolstered by several court opinions,61 have argued that 
such expert eyewitness evidence is inherently more prejudicial than probative as the scientific 
bases upon which these opinions are founded is at best shaky and may not be relevant to the 
particular case in which it is presented.  Several courts have also pointed out that such testimony 
would only confuse the jury,62 or result in a “battle of experts” that would inevitably waste the 
court’s time.63 
                                                 
58 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
59 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
60 See Ebbesen & Konecni, supra note 25. 
61 See, e.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir. 1982) (expressing concern about “open[ing] the 
door to a barrage of marginally relevant psychological evidence”); United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 384 (1st 
Cir. 1979); United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146, 150 (9th Cir. 1974).   
62 United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d. Cir. 2000) (expert testimony on eyewitness evidence may 
confusing); United States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921, 926 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Serna, 799 F.2d 842, 850 (2d 
Cir. 1986) (expert testimony could “muddy the waters”). 
63 See, e.g., United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383–84 (1st Cir. 1979); People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 727 
(Cal. 1984) (en banc) (arguing that the trial court still has discretion to exclude eyewitness expert testimony to avoid 
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2. Alabama Rules of Evidence 
Rule 702 of the Alabama Rules of Evidence was revised to adopt the wording of the 
Federal Rule dealing with expert testimony.  It states: “If scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”64  The Advisory 
Committee notes that historically, expert witnesses have been permitted only upon subjects 
found to be beyond the understanding of the average layperson; therefore, the phrase “assist the 
trier of fact” has been interpreted strictly to exclude expert testimony on subjects within the 
prototypical juror’s comprehension,65 which arguably includes much expert eyewitness 
evidence.66  The threshold determinations of whether an expert’s testimony qualifies as 
“scientific” and whether a particular expert is qualified to testify on a certain subject are squarely 
within the discretion of the trial court,67 as well as the judgment as to whether or not such 
testimony will “assist the trier of fact.”68  In refusing to incorporate the 1991 federal amendment 
concerning the three requirements for the bases of qualified expert testimony, the Advisory 
                                                                                                                                                             
having too much expert testimony); State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208, 1224 (Ariz. 1983) (en banc) (admitting 
eyewitness expert testimony, but arguing that the admission is not meant to “open the gates” to such testimony).  See 
also, Roger B. Handberg, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: A New Pair of Glasses for the Jury, 32 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013, 1040–41 (1995). 
 One commentator suggests that the problem of eyewitness expert testimony creating a “battle of the 
experts” will diminish as prosecutors begin to call more expert witnesses to rebut defendants’ experts.  See Joseph 
Sanders, Expert Witnesses in Eyewitness Facial Identification Cases, 17. TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1409, 1469 (1986).  
Because the prosecution’s rebuttal witnesses will limit the effectiveness of bringing an eyewitness expert, 
defendants will save their experts only for those instances in which the scientific literature clearly favors its side.  Id.  
64 ALA. R. EVID. 702. 
65 ALA. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes. 
66 See Part III.E infra.  
67 Hagler v. Gilliland, 292 So. 2d 647 (Ala. 1974); Griffin v. Gregory, 355 So. 2d 691 (Ala. 1978) (observing that 
whether to allow a witness to testify as an expert is largely in the trial court’s discretion and that the exercise of this 
discretion will not be disturbed except for abuse). 
68 See Baker v. Edgar, 472 So. 2d 968 (Ala. 1985); Price v. Jacobs, 387 So. 2d 172 (Ala. 1980); Glaze v. Tennyson, 
352 So. 2d 1335 (Ala. 1977).  See also C. GAMBLE, MCELROY’S ALABAMA EVIDENCE § 127.01(5) (4th ed. 1991). 
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Committee noted that such an amendment “raises more questions than it answers,”69 and thus 
preferred to retain Rule 703 as the only evidentiary rule detailing the allowable foundations for 
expert testimony. 
Alabama Rule 703 provides: “The facts or data in the particular case upon which an 
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at 
or before the hearing.”70  In Alabama, an expert witness may give opinion testimony based upon 
either facts about which he has personal knowledge or facts already in evidence or to be placed 
in evidence presented to him by a hypothetical.71  At first glance, this would appear to suggest 
that most eyewitness expert testimony would be inadmissible, as most of these witnesses are 
unfamiliar with the particular witnesses in the case and have only read the case file at most.  
However, according to the Alabama Supreme Court, expert opinions based on abstract theory 
and recited by experts unfamiliar with the facts of the case in question may be admissible.72 
Alabama Rule of Evidence 403 reads exactly as the Federal Rule, reproduced above.73  It 
generally expresses the development of the common law in Alabama prior to the revision of the 
Federal Rules, allowing the trial judge to exclude evidence when she determines that the 
probative value of such evidence is outweighed substantially by the prejudicial effect, confusing 
or misleading the jury, undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.74  The 
overwhelming majority of Alabama case law arising under Rule 403 concludes that the trial 
court has discretion to exclude evidence on these grounds,75 and such discretion will not be 
                                                 
69 ALA. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes. 
70 ALA. R. EVID. 703.   
71 ALA. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s notes. 
72 Id. (quoting Ex Parte Williams, 594 So. 2d 1225, 1227 (1992)). 
73 ALA. R. EVID. 403. 
74 Valley Mining Corp. v. Metro Bank, 383 So. 2d 158 (Ala. 1980). 
75 ALA. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s notes.  See, e.g., Ott v. Smith, 413 So. 2d 1129 (Ala. 1982) (recognizing 
that such a decision is largely within the trial court’s discretion).  See also W. SCHROEDER ET AL., ALABAMA 
EVIDENCE § 4–3 (1987). 
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reversed on appeal unless abused.76  An examination of the case law focuses the analysis further 
on the particular issue of the proper admission expert eyewitness evidence.  
B. Case Law 
1. Federal Cases 
Unquestionably, the seminal case on the admission of expert testimony in general is 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., decided by the Supreme Court in 1993.77  The 
Daubert court held that the previous test for the admission of expert testimony enunciated in 
Frye v. United States78 was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence.79  The 
court went on to announce a new test for the admissibility of expert testimony based upon the 
principles announced in Rule 702 of the Federal Rules and the scientific method.80  The court 
devised an inquiry to aid trial courts in determining the admissibility of expert testimony, which 
focused on: whether the technique can and has been tested; peer review and publication; the 
known and potential rate of error in the methodology; and the general acceptance by the 
scientific community.81  Thus, the court envisioned that the trial judge would conduct a 
preliminary hearing in which she would not only determine the general relevance of the 
proffered expert testimony under Rules 401 and 403, but also the admissibility of the evidence 
based upon its scientific merit—or more specifically, whether the “theory or technique is 
scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact”82—under Rule 702, following the guidelines 
                                                 
76 AmSouth Bank, N.A. v. Spigener, 505 S. 2d 1030 (Ala. 1986) (holding that questions of materiality, relevancy, 
and remoteness rest largely with the trial judge and that rulings thereon will not be disturbed unless the judge’s 
discretion has been absued). 
77 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
78 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
79 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587. 
80 Thomas Dillickrath, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: Admissibility and Alternatives, 55 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 1059, 1065 (2001). 
81 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94. 
82 Id. at 593. 
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set out by the court.83  The Supreme Court further clarified this standard in Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael,84 deeming the Daubert test to be “flexible” and stating that the Daubert factors 
“neither necessarily nor exclusively apply to all experts or in every case.”85  The Kumho opinion 
suggests that a search for assurances of scientific validity is inherent in the discretionary process 
afforded the trial court.86  
Since Daubert binds only the federal courts by interpreting the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, its predecessor—Frye v. United States87—still remains the governing standard in 
Alabama, and in many other states.88  The Frye court announced the “general acceptance” test: 
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the 
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.  Somewhere in this 
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while 
courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony from a well-recognized 
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must 
be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular 
field in which it belongs.89 
 
Thus, in Alabama, scientific studies are admissible only when they have gained general 
acceptance in the particular field,90 and the studies supporting expert eyewitness testimony are 
not “generally accepted” in the psychological field.91 
                                                 
83 Such a hearing would be appropriate under Rule 104(a) of the Federal Rules, which allows for the court to 
determine the admissibility of evidence outside the province of the jury.   
 
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a 
privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court . . . .  In making its 
determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges. 
 
FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
84 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
85 Id. at 140–41. 
86 Dillickrath, supra note 80, at 1065–66. 
87 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
88 ALA. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes.  See also Ex Parte Perry, 586 So. 2d 242, 247 (Ala. 1991). 
89 Frye, 293 F. at 1014. 
90 See Kent v. Singleton, 457 So. 2d 356 (Ala. 1984); Ex Parte Dolvin, 391 So. 2d 677 (Ala. 1980). 
91 See Part I.B supra.   
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One notable Supreme Court case directly addressing eyewitness identification is Neil v. 
Biggers.92  In reviewing a conviction based largely on the victim’s eyewitness identification, the 
court elaborated on factors to be considered in evaluating the eyewitness testimony: 
[T]he factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification 
include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the 
crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior 
description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at 
the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the 
confrontation.93 
 
The court was unsatisfied with the lower court’s substitution of its judgment for that of the jury 
in the case and determined that the jury was in the best position to determine if the identification 
was reliable or not.94  Thus, the Supreme Court is hesitant to take the determination of the 
reliability of eyewitness testimony out of the province of the jury. 
In United States v. Amaral,95 the Ninth Circuit applied the Frye test in an eyewitness 
expert case.96  The court listed four elements which must be met before an expert is permitted to 
testify: the witness must be qualified as an expert; the testimony must concern a subject matter 
proper for expert testimony; the testimony must be in accordance with a generally accepted 
scientific theory; and the probative value of the evidence must outweigh its prejudicial effect.97  
The court found that the expert testimony was properly excluded as this issue was squarely 
within the trial judge’s discretion, the trial judge could have plausibly determined that such 
evidence would have been more prejudicial than probative, and the trial judge was within his 
discretion in holding that such evidence would improperly take the determination of the 
                                                 
92 409 U.S. 188 (1972). 
93 Id. at 199–200. 
94 Id. at 200. 
95 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973). 
96 Id. at 1152.   
97 Id. at 1153. 
22 
eyewitnesses’ credibility out of the province of the jury.98  The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed their 
position on such testimony in United States v. Rincon,99 this time holding that such evidence did 
not conform to a generally accepted scientific theory and it would have confused the jury.100 
In United States v. Smith, the Sixth Circuit reviewed the conviction of a defendant for 
armed robbery, based in part on eyewitness testimony of the victims.101  The court recited the 
four elements cited by the Ninth Circuit in Amaral.102   Despite the fact that the government 
conceded that the witness was a qualified expert, and even though the court determined 
psychological testimony may have been a proper subject for expert testimony, conformed to a 
generally accepted explanatory theory, and provided probative value, the court went on to hold 
that the trial court’s exclusion of such evidence under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules was 
harmless error.103  Since the government had forensic evidence in addition to the independent 
identifications of three eyewitnesses, the court found that the exclusion of the evidence “did not 
‘prejudice’ the defendant to the extent of affecting the verdict.”104 
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit upheld the defendant’s conviction for robbery in United 
States v. Purham.105  In finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert 
testimony on eyewitness identification, the court approved of the trial court’s determination that 
such evidence was not sufficiently beyond the understanding of lay jurors to satisfy Rule 702 of 
the Federal Rules.106  The court further noted, “the unfair prejudice which might have resulted 
because of the aura of reliability and trustworthiness that surrounds scientific evidence 
                                                 
98 Id. at 1152–53. 
99 984 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1993). 
100 Id. at 1005–1007. 
101 736 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1984). 
102 Id. at 1105. 
103 Id. at 1105–1107. 
104 Id. at 1108. 
105 725 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1984). 
106 Id. at 454. 
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outweighed any small aid the expert testimony may have provided.”107  The Eighth Circuit 
adhered to this line of reasoning in United States v. Blade where it held that the admission of 
such testimony was soundly within the trial court’s discretion, and thus was properly 
excluded.108  Furthermore, the court noted that there was substantial corroborating evidence 
linking the defendant to the crime.109 
In United States v. Moore, the Fifth Circuit accepted that expert eyewitness testimony is 
admissible in certain cases as it could often be helpful to the trier of fact.110  However, after 
consideration of all of the evidence, the court found that the exclusion of expert testimony in this 
particular case was properly within the discretion of the trial court and did not prejudice the 
defendant, as the other evidence of guilt was overwhelming.111  The court emphasized that 
“[a]lthough admission of expert eyewitness testimony is proper, there is no federal authority for 
the proposition that such testimony must be admitted.”112  Concluding the discussion of the issue, 
the court noted that in a case in which the sole testimony is casual eyewitness identification, 
“expert testimony regarding the accuracy of that identification is admissible and properly may be 
encouraged.”113  A year later, in United States v. Alexander, the Fifth Circuit distinguished 
Moore.114  In Alexander, the defendant was convicted of bank robbery based solely on the 
identification of his photograph by three bank employees.115  The defendant put forth a defense 
of mistaken identity and offered the testimony of two experts—one an orthodontist specializing 
in celphalometrics (the scientific measurement of the dimensions of the head) and the other a 
                                                 
107 Id. 
108 811 F.2d 461, 465 (8th Cir. 1987). 
109 Id. at 466. 
110 786 F.2d 1308, 1312 (5th Cir. 1986). 
111 Id. at 1312–13. 
112 Id. (emphasis in original). 
113 Id. at 1313. 
114 816 F.2d 164 (5th Cir. 1987). 
115 Id. at 166. 
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former F.B.I. agent with expertise in photograph comparisons—both of which concluded that it 
was impossible for the defendant to be the person depicted in the photographs.116  In 
distinguishing this case from Moore, the court reasoned that here the proffered testimony 
pertained to the precise issue before the jury, while the defendant in Moore offered expert 
testimony only about the general problems with eyewitness perception and memory.117 
 Requiring the admission of the expert testimony proffered in Moore would have 
established a rule that experts testifying generally as to the value of eyewitness 
testimony would have to be allowed to testify in every case in which eyewitness 
testimony is relevant.  This would constitute a gross overburdening of the trial 
process by testimony about matters which juries have always been deemed 
competent to evaluate.118 
 
The First Circuit found expert eyewitness evidence properly excluded by the trial court in 
United States v. Fosher.119  Not only was this issue within the sound discretion of the trial court, 
but the trial court could also properly conclude that “scientific evaluation either has not reached, 
or perhaps cannot reach a level of reliability such that scientific analysis of a question of fact 
surpasses the quality of common sense evaluation inherent in jury deliberations.”120  Noting that 
it shared the trial court’s concerns that such evidence would be more prejudicial than probative, 
the court further voiced its concerns that the presentation of the expert testimony could impose 
the unnecessary time and expense involved in a battle of experts.121    
The Third Circuit focused the discussion of the admission of expert eyewitness testimony 
on the “fit” of the proffered evidence to the facts of the case at trial in United States v. 
Downing.122  The Downing court established a two-part test for the admission of expert 
eyewitness testimony, which made the admission of such testimony “not automatic but 
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conditional” upon its satisfaction of the test.123  The first inquiry is essentially a balancing test, 
weighing the reliability of the scientific principles upon which the expert testimony rests against 
the likelihood that the introduction of such testimony may confuse or mislead the jury.124  The 
second inquiry depends upon the “‘fit’ [of the evidence], i.e., upon a specific proffer showing 
that scientific research has established that particular features of the eyewitness identifications 
involved may have impaired accuracy of those identifications.”125  Since the defendant in the 
case was convicted solely on the basis of eyewitness testimony, the court could not deem the 
exclusion of the evidence by the trial court to be harmless, and thus vacated the conviction and 
remanded the case to the district court for a hearing on the admissibility of the expert testimony 
in accordance with the principles the court had announced.126   
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit, which is most pertinent to Alabama state courts, has often 
considered the admission of expert eyewitness testimony and held such evidence to be 
unnecessary or inadmissible.  In Rodriguez v. Wainwright, the court held, without substantive 
discussion, that the exclusion of expert testimony concerning the subjects of memory and 
perception in eyewitness testimony did not deny the habeas petitioner the right to a fair trial 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.127  One year later, in 
Jones v. Smith, the court held that the failure of the defendant’s attorney to offer expert testimony 
on the unreliability of eyewitness identification did not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel, as the likelihood of mistaken identification was brought to the jury’s full attention 
through cross-examination.128  Finally, in United States v. Smith, the court definitively held 
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expert eyewitness testimony inadmissible under Daubert.129  Relying on its decision in Thevis,130 
the court found that “expert testimony regarding eyewitness reliability was not needed, because 
the jury could determine the reliability of eyewitness identification with the tools of cross-
examination.”131  The court reasoned that since expert testimony that does not assist the trier of 
fact can be excluded under the second prong of the Daubert test, and Thevis held that expert 
eyewitness testimony does not assist the jury, Thevis was therefore in harmony with Daubert and 
would not be overruled.132  Since the court determined itself to be bound by prior precedent until 
overruled by the Supreme Court or en banc, the court held that such evidence was inadmissible 
in the Eleventh Circuit, although it emphasized that other adequate measures could be taken by 
the defense to mitigate the effects of eyewitness testimony, including effective cross-examination 
and requesting jury instructions on the subject.133  The Eleventh Circuit bar on the admissibility 
of such evidence serves to reinforce the argument that Alabama state courts can permissibly 
establish a presumption against the admissibility of such evidence, since, aside from the Supreme 
Court, the Eleventh Circuit’s decisions provide the most guidance to Alabama state courts, 
located in that circuit.  
2.   Alabama Cases 
The seminal Alabama case on the admissibility of expert eyewitness testimony is Ex 
Parte Williams.134  A jury had convicted the defendant of attempted murder and robbery in the 
first degree based solely on the victim’s identification of her assailant.135  The Supreme Court 
granted the defendant’s petition to examine the issue of whether the trial court had abused it 
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discretion in refusing to allow the defendant’s expert to testify as to the reliability of the State’s 
eyewitness, noting that “the admissibility of expert testimony on the subject of human memory 
process has never been considered by the appellate courts of this state.”136  The court adopted the 
reasoning of the Downing court, stating “the admission of expert testimony on the subject of 
human memory processes is not automatic but conditional.”137  After reviewing the trend in both 
state and federal case law to allow expert testimony on the subject of human memory, the court 
held that “expert testimony on the subject of human memory can be introduced into evidence in 
cases turning on eyewitness identification.”138  The court went on, “[w]e further hold, however, 
that the admissibility of such evidence, is, like all other types of expert testimony, subject to the 
discretion of the trial court.”139  After reviewing the record of the trial court, the court found no 
abuse of discretion in this case, as the trial court had determined that the proposed expert was not 
familiar with the facts of the particular case and had no personal contact with the victim, and thus 
affirmed the conviction.140  Therefore, the Alabama Supreme Court recognizes the admissibility 
of expert eyewitness testimony, but will allow the trial court to properly exclude such evidence 
even where the State’s case rests entirely on eyewitness identification.  The court seems more 
concerned with the expert’s familiarity with the particular facts of the case and the 
victims/eyewitnesses than with the admission of general abstract theories on the fallibility of 
eyewitness identification.  Therefore, it appears that the Alabama criminal courts would be 
justified in excluding expert eyewitness testimony in the majority of cases, unless the defense 
takes measures to familiarize the expert with the specific facts of the case and has the expert 
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interview the victim/witness in the case.  So, the adoption of a presumption against admission, as 
I suggest, would actually be a liberalization of the court’s policy.   
After the Alabama Supreme Court’s ruling, Alabama trial courts have had several 
opportunities to apply the standard announced in Ex Parte Williams.  Although there are several 
such cases, I will only discuss a few.  In State v. Bonner, the trial judge admitted the defense’s 
expert eyewitness testimony, finding that the witness was a qualified expert in the field of 
behavioral psychology and the defense had laid a proper predicate for the admission of such 
testimony, satisfying the standards of Daubert.141  The trial judge was particularly concerned 
with the fact that the state’s case rested entirely on eyewitness testimony (not the victim’s, as the 
charge was homicide) and circumstantial evidence.142  One year later, a different trial judge 
admitted expert eyewitness testimony in State v. Edwards.143  The trial judge was hesitant to 
admit the expert’s testimony as an expert on eyewitness identification, but ultimately allowed the 
testimony as the state’s entire case relied solely on eyewitness identifications of three victims of 
the robberies.144   The trial judge went on to state that she was concerned about the fact that the 
expert had not had any contact with the witnesses, and she also stated that she may not be 
disposed to rule similarly in other cases dealing with this issue where the State offered other 
corroborating evidence of guilt.145  The most recent case considering the admission of expert 
eyewitness testimony is State v. Frank, in which the defendant was charged with robbery.146  The 
trial judge excluded the expert’s testimony regarding reliability of eyewitness identification after 
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finding a lack of predicate establishing the authority of the texts and treatises on which the expert 
relied; therefore, the expert testimony did not qualify for admission under Daubert.147  The court 
also concluded that the defense failed to prove the research was generally accepted in the field, 
and thus the evidence failed the Frye test, and found the helpfulness of the expert’s testimony 
referencing verdicts in other cases would be outweighed by the confusion caused in the case at 
bar, and thus could be excluded under Alabama Rule of Evidence 403.148  To summarize, it 
appears that the Alabama trial courts are willing to admit such testimony when the State’s 
evidence consists only of eyewitness evidence, but have serious reservations about the quality 
and helpfulness of the evidence in general, especially in cases where it would be confusing.  A 
presumption against the admission of such testimony would establish consistency among the 
Alabama circuit courts as well as demanding that the defense ensure that such evidence will be 
specifically addressed to the issues in the case at bar. 
III. Five Arguments Against the Admissibility of Expert Testimony on the Reliability of 
Eyewitness Testimony in the Case of Alabama  
A.   Discretion of the Trial Court 
First, admitting any expert on eyewitness identification is firmly within the discretion of 
the trial court and, according to the Supreme Court of Alabama, the “trial court’s rulings on 
admissibility of . . . [expert testimony on eyewitness identification] will not be disturbed on 
appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion.”149  The trial court is in the best position to judge if 
this expert testimony is necessary in the particular circumstances of the case, so that any 
appellate review on the admissibility ruling of this type of evidence should be extremely limited, 
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and is only disturbed after a finding of abuse of discretion.150  The best case for admitting such 
testimony is when the state reliance on the testimony is exclusive or especially robust, with little 
corroboration.  Only the trial court is in the position to determine how strongly other evidence 
inculpates a defendant and whether such evidence corroborates the eyewitness’s testimony and 
thus determine if the witness is warranted.151 
 B.  Useful (and Usually Admitted) Only in Certain Cases 
Most of the cases in which such testimony has been found to be admissible have involved 
no other evidence besides the testimony of one eyewitness.  Some such cases have also involved 
identifications of the defendant by several eyewitnesses, but no other corroborating testimony or 
evidence.152  These seem to be the rare cases that may call for such expert testimony, as all other 
cases typically provide some kind of corroborating evidence to be weighed by the finder of fact 
along with the eyewitness identification.153  Courts have repeatedly recognized the need for 
expert eyewitness testimony in cases based solely on eyewitness identifications and encouraged 
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its use in these cases, while warning that this should not lead to a general presumption of 
admissibility in all cases involving eyewitness identifications.154 
C.   More Prejudicial Than Probative 
Generally, such experts do not testify to the reliability or accuracy of a particular 
witness’s identification.  Instead, these experts testify to the possibility for inaccuracy in 
eyewitness identifications in general and the research experiments and studies done in this field 
by the scientific community.  Therefore, these experts may not be in the position to offer any 
evidence with probative value that outweighs its prejudicial effect.155  Since they have not 
spoken directly with any witnesses or victims and, further, since they are often only superficially 
acquainted with the facts of the case, they can only testify to general findings made by some 
researchers in the field, which may not even be representative of the majority view of the 
scientific community on a particular issue.156  A jury may be overwhelmed by the expert’s 
testimony or tend to give it greater credibility or consideration.157  This would unfairly 
undermine the state’s case, considering the general nature of the expert testimony in these 
instances and the substantial weight accorded expert testimony by jurors. 
D.   Not a Well-Established Field of Scientific Research 
Additionally, the research field of eyewitness identification has no generally accepted 
theories of which to boast, neither is there an established procedure for conducting experiments 
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upon which findings in the field are based.158  The evidence revealed by many of the studies is 
inconsistent, the procedures and measures used to study various relationships are not in accord 
with legal procedure, and there is no evidence that the experts who testify would be any better at 
detecting witness inaccuracy than uninformed jurors.159  Therefore, for the reasons more fully 
explored above, including: the lack of relevance of the foundational studies to the actual 
eyewitnesses involved; the interaction problem, concerning the relationships among factors 
tending to make an identification inaccurate; inconsistency amongst the studies; and criticisms of 
specific theories, such as the relationship of stress to accurate identifications or the theory of 
weapon focus.   
E.   Effective Safeguards Already Exist 
Finally, there are several procedural safeguards already in place to combat jurors’ blind 
acceptance of eyewitness testimony.  The defense can call attention to many factors that may 
affect identification accuracy through cross-examination and closing arguments.160  An effective 
cross-examination, even one touching on theories of the sources of inaccuracy in eyewitness 
identification, is often more effective than expert testimony at neutralizing damaging eyewitness 
evidence presented by the prosecution.  Also, judges and jurors have common sense and 
knowledge from their own personal life experiences that they bring into the court room and take 
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with them into the jury room.161  Judges and jurors rarely accept any trial evidence uncritically, 
and eyewitness testimony, though potentially more convincing, is still subject to review by the 
trier of fact.162  These general conclusions are bolstered by the specific fiscal and political 
situations in which Alabama finds itself regarding indigent defense, discussed below. 
 
IV. Alabama Policy and the Admission of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Evidence 
 A. The Criminal Defense Bar 
Beyond the five arguments listed above, there are policy reasons particular to the 
Alabama State Criminal Justice System that militate against admitting such testimony as a matter 
of course.  Presently, Alabama’s indigent defense system has been harshly criticized by the 
American Bar Association and other organizations as being both inefficient and inadequate to 
meet the needs of indigent defendants.163  The Alabama system is a decentralized and 
fragmented system controlled by circuit court (trial level) judges in Alabama’s circuits.164  Most 
Alabama counties do not have public defender offices—instead there are three representation 
service models used in Alabama.165  Out of the forty-one judicial circuits, four have a full-time 
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public defender office, and one judicial circuit has a part-time public defender.166  Ten judicial 
circuits use the contract defender system, wherein private attorneys are hired for a set dollar 
amount each month to handle all indigent cases.167  Additionally, these contract defenders are 
allowed to maintain a separate private practice.168  Twenty-six judicial circuits use an 
appointment system, whereby private attorneys place their names on an appointment list and are 
periodically asked to represent indigent defendants.169  These appointed attorneys are paid on an 
hourly rate basis, plus an allowance for office overhead.170   
Anecdotal evidence sheds an unflattering light on the Alabama indigent defense system 
as well.   
Montgomery defense lawyer Steve Glassroth remembers his encounter, not so 
long ago, with a defense attorney for an indigent man who didn't recognize his 
client in the courtroom less than a week before trials were set to start. "He told the 
judge he couldn't find his client, and he'd been sending him letters," Glassroth 
said. "The client got up and said, "Here I am.'"171 
 
In my personal experience as an intern at the Jefferson County District Attorney’s Office, I 
would often see young or otherwise under-employed attorneys waiting in the courtroom on the 
days that criminal defendants were arraigned.  If an indigent defendant had no representation, the 
“formalities” of picking an attorney from a list would often be overlooked, and the attorneys in 
the courtroom would bargain amongst themselves for those defendants needing representation.  
It resembled something of an auction floor or backroom favor system, but did not approach my 
expectation of justice or meaningful choice for these defendants.   
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In addition to structural problems with the system, more specific criticisms have been 
aimed at these different models of indigent representation. Often, the attorneys willing to take 
such cases are those that have recently graduated from law school, and thus often are not 
sufficiently experienced to represent indigent defendants.172   Other attorneys seeking these 
assignments use these cases to supplement their private practices and it is an unfortunate fact that 
attorneys will often spend more time on cases in which they have been retained by private 
parties, as they will usually receive higher compensation for these cases.173 Contract defenders in 
Alabama have been accused of providing constitutionally inadequate representation.174  “In nine 
of Alabama’s judicial circuits where contracts for indigent defense services are utilized, the 
contracts are awarded on primarily on the basis of cost, not quality or other important 
considerations, in direct contradiction to guidance contained in national indigent defense 
standards.”175  Some critics claim that contract defenders are “basically doing nothing” in that 
the usually just enter guilty pleas for their clients, and may, therefore, spend as little as ten 
minutes on an individual’s case.176  The Appleseed Foundation’s Alabama Center examined the 
files of four circuits’ contract defenders, and found that of the 1,585 completed criminal cases for 
indigent defendants, eighty-two per cent were guilty pleas and lawyers took only fifty-three of 
the cases to trial.177  The most glaring failure of the Alabama indigent defense system may be its 
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lack of data similar to that just presented—something necessary to bring to the forefront the 
many flaws in the system in individual circuits.178 
B. Budgetary Concerns 
When Governor Bob Riley took office in January 2003, he was faced with a budgetary 
shortfall gap of $675 million projected for FY 2004 for the combined General Fund and 
Education Trust Fund budgets, $198 million of which was attributable to the General Fund.179  In 
his State of the State address in March 2003, Riley announced an ambitious plan to reduce 
unnecessary government expenditures and to reform state tax policy to address Alabama’s 
budget problems.180  In Alabama, many changes in the tax system require a constitutional 
amendment passed by voter referendum,181 and thus Riley undertook a comprehensive tax 
proposal designed not only to meet the projected budget shortfall but also to provide sufficient 
revenues to invest in a “world-class education” system for the state.182  The tax reform plan 
proposed both raising some tax rates and redistributing the burden of taxes across groups.183  
Although the plan would have added an estimated $1-1.2 billion in annual revenues, many 
Alabama residents, particularly the poor, would have seen reduced taxes.184  Property taxes 
would have been raised substantially but would still have remained the lowest in the country.185 
Income taxes would have been reduced for the poorest state residents and raised for the highest 
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income group.186 A variety of other tax increases were proposed including taxes on cigarettes, 
sales, businesses, and utilities.187  The tax reform referendum was put to the voters in September 
2003 and failed by a large margin after a lengthy campaign involved ardent supporters and 
opponents alike.188 
Thus, it was back to the policy drawing board, and Governor Bob Riley next turned to a 
plan of drastic reductions in state expenditures.189  One of the proposed budget cuts is reducing 
the indigent defense budget by thirty per cent by eliminating the overhead payments to contract 
lawyers and those assigned to cases, and shifting that $14 million into Medicaid.190  The shift 
would not only cut indigent defense funding, but would also reduce funds available to lawyers 
who represent children in abuse and neglect cases, said Bill Blanchard, a Montgomery lawyer 
who is legislative chairman for the Alabama Criminal Defense Lawyers Association.191 
Blanchard commented: 
The entire culture is starting to realize that the quality of justice you get in these 
kind of cases depends on having well-trained, well-funded attorneys. Here we 
have our governor trying to reduce the funding for indigent defense and basically 
turning their backs on the poorest and most disadvantaged.  The primary thing 
we're talking about is delivery of legal services to the poor. This is a time we're 
seeing on a daily, a weekly, a monthly basis where cases are being reversed 
because they don't have adequate representation.192 
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Thus, Alabama’s budgetary crisis has put indigent defense in the spotlight—both as a 
cause for concern and as a possible fiscal reduction.193  With such a constraint on 
resources and the failure of the plan to increase revenue, sweeping spending reductions 
will be made in the state budget.  Instead of increasing funding for indigent defense, 
lawmakers are proposing reducing these resources, making frugality and priorities key to 
any spending decision.  Placing the issue in context, it becomes clearer that state funds, if 
spent on expert eyewitness testimony, would be misallocated. 
C. Solutions 
Most cases in which defense attorneys have sought to admit eyewitness expert testimony 
have been those cases involving appointed counsel.194  Instead of diverting the court’s attention 
and resources to deciding these pre-trial motions for admissibility and in lieu of exhausting state 
funds for such expert testimony, the focus of the Alabama Criminal Justice System should be to 
provide indigent defendants with a more effective and skilled defense in the first place—by 
either increasing fees for appointed cases and raising the standard that attorneys must meet to 
qualify for such appointments or by establishing public defender offices throughout the state.  
Undoubtedly, this is a criticism more properly directed at the structure of the Alabama Criminal 
Justice System rather than at the discrete issue of admitting eyewitness expert testimony; 
however, since efforts at recent reform have largely failed in this area,195 it is best to conserve the 
state’s resources and re-allocate them as it appears that the present system is here to stay, at least 
                                                 
193 For a good general discussion of rationing criminal defense entitlements in light of state budget constraints see 
Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument from Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 801 (2004).  
194 See, e.g,, State v. Edwards, CC 01-183, CC 01-184, Jefferson Co., Ala. Cir. Ct. (Nov. 1, 2001) (allowing the 
admission of expert testimony on eyewitness identification) and State v. Bonner, CC 00-1271, CC 00-1272, 
Jefferson Co., Ala. Cir. Ct. (Mar. 1, 2000) (allowing the admission of expert testimony on eyewitness identification); 
State v. Frank, CC 04-4329, Mobile Co., Ala. Cir. Ct. (June 6, 2005) (prohibiting the admission of expert testimony 
on eyewitness identification) 
195 Gideon’s Broken Promise, supra note 163. 
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for the time being.  Thus, I would propose that the Alabama Courts (acting through an explicit 
Alabama Supreme Court ruling or by legislative mandate, if necessary) adopt a presumption 
against admission of eyewitness expert testimony except in cases where state reliance on such 
evidence is so strong as to warrant the extra protection against a wrongful conviction.  There 
should be a clearly enunciated test as to when such a presumption can be overcome by the 
defense in any case that does not fall under such exception.196  Such an evidentiary presumption 




 After reviewing the scientific research concerning the possible sources of error found in 
eyewitness testimony, it is clear that human memory and perception is susceptible to numerous 
defects, especially when subjected to stressful events and asked to identify particular individuals 
or recall specific details.  One proposed solution to this pernicious yet ubiquitous problem is the 
introduction of expert testimony to elucidate the weaknesses inherent in eyewitness testimony.   
Rules 403 and 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, as well as the Alabama Rules of Evidence, 
provide some guidance for the admission of expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness 
identifications.  Federal and state case law affords further instruction for admitting such 
                                                 
196 One possible test was enunciated by the Fourth Circuit in U.S. v. Harris.  The Harris court noted the recent 
liberalization of courts’ admission of expert eyewitness evidence: 
 
[T]here has been a trend in recent years to allow such testimony under circumstances described as 
"narrow." . . . The narrow circumstances held sufficient to support the introduction of expert 
testimony have varied but have included such problems as cross-racial identification, identification 
after a long delay, identification after observation under stress, and psychological phenomena as 
the feedback factor and unconscious transference.  
 
U.S. v. Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 534–35 (4th Cir. 1993).  Thus, perhaps the Alabama Supreme Court or the Alabama 
Legislature could develop a test by which the presumption of such evidence is excluded by singling out those factors 
or circumstances under which expert eyewitness evidence is particularly helpful, as the Harris court seems to 
suggest.   
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testimony into evidence, but reserves the ultimate discretion to the trial court’s discretion.  Legal 
scholars as well as defense attorneys principally argue that the introduction of such testimony 
would benefit defendants as the jury would more fully appreciate eyewitness evidence and the 
end result would reduce the number of wrongful convictions, which, according to them, the 
system should be unwilling to tolerate.  However, the liberal admission of such testimony is not 
warranted in the case of Alabama.  Five principal arguments counsel against the admission of 
expert testimony, which include: the trial court’s discretion in admitting such evidence; the 
evidence’s limited utility; the evidence can be more prejudicial than probative in a jury trial 
setting; there is considerable disagreement within the scientific community about the accuracy 
and value of such evidence; and efficacious safeguards already exist or more effective safeguards 
should take priority over the admission of such evidence.  Since the state already suffers from 
inadequate funding for the defense of the indigent, along with an inefficient and derisory system 
of indigent defense, I propose that Alabama’s criminal justice system and Alabama defendants 
alike would be better served by implementing a presumption against the admissibility of such 
expensive expert testimony.  This presumption coupled with a bright line test for the admission 
of this evidence in certain cases would allow the state to concentrate on improving its provision 
of legal entitlements to all indigent defendants. 
